내셔널 아카데미 오브 싸이언스에서 불법채류자때문에 약 6300조가 들거라 한다
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읽기전: 미국 아카데미오브 사이언스 NAS는 153년된 미국의 None Profit 단체로 act of congress로 아브라함 링컨이 apporve한 단체이며 나라를 위해 bi bipartician (정당을 넘어) 과학과 통계를 만드는 단체이다.
2016 미국 내셔널 아카데미 오브 싸이언스에 의하면
1. 불채자 명당 약 65만불, 불체자 한사람당 정부에서 7-8억을 써야 한다.
2. 불체자 자녀 연간 평균 명당 정부에서 12000불을 받아간다고 한다. (24000불 빼기 세금 = 12000)
3. 불체자를 가만이두고 계속 있거나 복기시켜주면 전체 6.3 트릴리언 달라가 들것이다.
4. 2010년 연구결과 불체자 가족이 연간 $31584 불을 받아간다고 한다.
5. 불체자 들때문에 연간 약 400조, 약 20년간 6000조 이상
여기 푸트노트다 세꺄
[1] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Committee on National Statistics; Panel on the Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration (Washington: National Academies Press, 2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23550/the-economic-and-fiscal-consequences-of-immigration (accessed December 2, 2016).
[2] Ibid., p. 351.
[3] The NAS study finds that the average net present value of the fiscal cost of each adult immigrant without a high school degree entering the U.S. is –$237,000. See ibid., p. 341, Table 8-12, which reflects the total impact figure from the calculation for all immigrants with no budget adjustments. The estimated non-discounted cost in 2012 constant dollars is $662,000.
[4] Estimated from Bryan Baker and Nancy Rytina, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2012,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Population Estimates, March 2013, p. 5, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf (accessed December 1, 2016).
[5] Heritage Foundation calculations based on U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement, https://dataferrett.census.gov (accessed March 13, 2015).
[6] Robert Rector, “The Fiscal Consequences of Executive Amnesty,” testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, March 17, 2015, p. 10, https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Mr.-Rector-Testimony-Bio-TNT.pdf.
[7] These bills were the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611), introduced in 2006; the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348), introduced in 2007; and the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 (S. 744, popularly known as the “Gang of Eight” bill), introduced in 2013.
[8] The federal government operates over 90 means-tested welfare programs. Benefits from these programs extend over the entire life span. Because the benefit system covers individuals from cradle to grave, postponing an immigrant’s access to welfare programs even for a decade has only a modest effect on life-time costs.
[9] Rector, “The Fiscal Consequences of Executive Amnesty.”
[10] It is sometimes argued that post-amnesty fiscal projections do not allow for the upward mobility of former illegal immigrants. However, the methods employed here assume that each former illegal immigrant will have wages and benefits after amnesty that are roughly equal to the wages and benefits of a current legal immigrant with the same age and level of education. Thus, the estimates allow for upward mobility of amnesty recipients. Because legal immigrants have more access to government benefits than do illegal immigrants, they tend to have greater fiscal costs per education level.
[11] Rector, “The Fiscal Consequences of Executive Amnesty.”
[12] The per-immigrant net present value figures in Table 2 are taken from National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, p. 341, Table 8-12, using the data for all immigrants with no budget adjustments. The figures are 75-year projections for immigrants and their descendants. For the education levels of adult illegal immigrants, see Table 1.
[13] Using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, 2016 Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement, there are 81.4 million households with a positive aggregate federal income tax liability after receipt of credits out of a total of 119.4 million households.
[14] This estimate uses the NAS discount rate of 3 percent and assumes that the constant-dollar fiscal costs are allocated equally over time.
[15] Some portion of future fiscal costs following amnesty would have occurred even without amnesty. The NAS data do not permit those costs to be separated from the extra costs that would be induced by amnesty per se. However, the bulk of the post-amnesty costs are generated by granting former illegal immigrants access to Social Security, Medicare, Obamacare, and means-tested welfare.
[16] Baker and Rytina, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population,” p. 1.
[17] Ibid, p. 4.
[18] Steven A. Camarota, “Amnesty Under Hagel–Martinez: An Estimate of How Many Will Legalize If S. 2611 Becomes Law,” Center for Immigration Studies Backgrounder, June 2006, p. 3, Table 1.
[19] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, p. 338. Of the 29 percent emigration rate, 22 percent occurs in the first 10 years after the immigrant’s arrival; only 7 percent occurs after 10 years. Granting an illegal immigrant amnesty would create a strong incentive for him to remain in the country.
[20] Approximately three-quarters of illegal immigrants have been in the U.S. more than 10 years. See Baker and Rytina, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population,” p. 3.
[21] This estimate is based on the average difference between legal and illegal immigrant fiscal costs per education group, multiplied by the percentage of immigrants in each education group who are illegal.
[22] Data provided by Steven Camarota of the Center for Immigration Studies.
[23] Migration Policy Institute, “Profile of the Unauthorized Population: United States,” http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US (accessed December 2, 2016).
[24] George J. Borjas, “The Labor Supply of Undocumented Immigrants,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 22102, March 2016, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22102.pdf (accessed December 2, 2016).
[25] The NAS study also includes several analyses that assign public goods costs to immigrants; this notably increases the fiscal cost of immigration. These analyses have not been used in the calculations presented in this paper.
[26] Peter B. Dixon and Maureen T. Rimmer, “Restriction or Legalization? Measuring the Economic Benefits of Immigration Reform,” Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis No. 40, August 13, 2009, http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/restriction-or-legalization-measuring-economic-benefits-immigration-reform (accessed December 2, 2016).
2016 미국 내셔널 아카데미 오브 싸이언스에 의하면
1. 불채자 명당 약 65만불, 불체자 한사람당 정부에서 7-8억을 써야 한다.
2. 불체자 자녀 연간 평균 명당 정부에서 12000불을 받아간다고 한다. (24000불 빼기 세금 = 12000)
3. 불체자를 가만이두고 계속 있거나 복기시켜주면 전체 6.3 트릴리언 달라가 들것이다.
4. 2010년 연구결과 불체자 가족이 연간 $31584 불을 받아간다고 한다.
5. 불체자 들때문에 연간 약 400조, 약 20년간 6000조 이상
여기 푸트노트다 세꺄
[1] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Committee on National Statistics; Panel on the Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration (Washington: National Academies Press, 2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23550/the-economic-and-fiscal-consequences-of-immigration (accessed December 2, 2016).
[2] Ibid., p. 351.
[3] The NAS study finds that the average net present value of the fiscal cost of each adult immigrant without a high school degree entering the U.S. is –$237,000. See ibid., p. 341, Table 8-12, which reflects the total impact figure from the calculation for all immigrants with no budget adjustments. The estimated non-discounted cost in 2012 constant dollars is $662,000.
[4] Estimated from Bryan Baker and Nancy Rytina, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2012,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Population Estimates, March 2013, p. 5, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf (accessed December 1, 2016).
[5] Heritage Foundation calculations based on U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement, https://dataferrett.census.gov (accessed March 13, 2015).
[6] Robert Rector, “The Fiscal Consequences of Executive Amnesty,” testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, March 17, 2015, p. 10, https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Mr.-Rector-Testimony-Bio-TNT.pdf.
[7] These bills were the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611), introduced in 2006; the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348), introduced in 2007; and the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 (S. 744, popularly known as the “Gang of Eight” bill), introduced in 2013.
[8] The federal government operates over 90 means-tested welfare programs. Benefits from these programs extend over the entire life span. Because the benefit system covers individuals from cradle to grave, postponing an immigrant’s access to welfare programs even for a decade has only a modest effect on life-time costs.
[9] Rector, “The Fiscal Consequences of Executive Amnesty.”
[10] It is sometimes argued that post-amnesty fiscal projections do not allow for the upward mobility of former illegal immigrants. However, the methods employed here assume that each former illegal immigrant will have wages and benefits after amnesty that are roughly equal to the wages and benefits of a current legal immigrant with the same age and level of education. Thus, the estimates allow for upward mobility of amnesty recipients. Because legal immigrants have more access to government benefits than do illegal immigrants, they tend to have greater fiscal costs per education level.
[11] Rector, “The Fiscal Consequences of Executive Amnesty.”
[12] The per-immigrant net present value figures in Table 2 are taken from National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, p. 341, Table 8-12, using the data for all immigrants with no budget adjustments. The figures are 75-year projections for immigrants and their descendants. For the education levels of adult illegal immigrants, see Table 1.
[13] Using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, 2016 Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement, there are 81.4 million households with a positive aggregate federal income tax liability after receipt of credits out of a total of 119.4 million households.
[14] This estimate uses the NAS discount rate of 3 percent and assumes that the constant-dollar fiscal costs are allocated equally over time.
[15] Some portion of future fiscal costs following amnesty would have occurred even without amnesty. The NAS data do not permit those costs to be separated from the extra costs that would be induced by amnesty per se. However, the bulk of the post-amnesty costs are generated by granting former illegal immigrants access to Social Security, Medicare, Obamacare, and means-tested welfare.
[16] Baker and Rytina, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population,” p. 1.
[17] Ibid, p. 4.
[18] Steven A. Camarota, “Amnesty Under Hagel–Martinez: An Estimate of How Many Will Legalize If S. 2611 Becomes Law,” Center for Immigration Studies Backgrounder, June 2006, p. 3, Table 1.
[19] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, p. 338. Of the 29 percent emigration rate, 22 percent occurs in the first 10 years after the immigrant’s arrival; only 7 percent occurs after 10 years. Granting an illegal immigrant amnesty would create a strong incentive for him to remain in the country.
[20] Approximately three-quarters of illegal immigrants have been in the U.S. more than 10 years. See Baker and Rytina, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population,” p. 3.
[21] This estimate is based on the average difference between legal and illegal immigrant fiscal costs per education group, multiplied by the percentage of immigrants in each education group who are illegal.
[22] Data provided by Steven Camarota of the Center for Immigration Studies.
[23] Migration Policy Institute, “Profile of the Unauthorized Population: United States,” http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US (accessed December 2, 2016).
[24] George J. Borjas, “The Labor Supply of Undocumented Immigrants,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 22102, March 2016, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22102.pdf (accessed December 2, 2016).
[25] The NAS study also includes several analyses that assign public goods costs to immigrants; this notably increases the fiscal cost of immigration. These analyses have not been used in the calculations presented in this paper.
[26] Peter B. Dixon and Maureen T. Rimmer, “Restriction or Legalization? Measuring the Economic Benefits of Immigration Reform,” Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis No. 40, August 13, 2009, http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/restriction-or-legalization-measuring-economic-benefits-immigration-reform (accessed December 2, 2016).
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